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The Constitutionality of State Tort Reform Legislation
and Lochner
George L. Priest·
Stephen Presser begins his interesting paper with the observation that
the invalidation of state tort reform legislation represents a severe crisis of
the legitimacy of law and legal institutions.! In fact, he states it was the
most severe crisis oflegitimacy of law and legal institutions in our nation's
history.2 Professor Presser claims that this crisis began in 1937 with the
legal movement known as Realism.3
I take an opposite view. The invalidation of state tort reform
legislation is not the result of Realism, but of the absence of Realism. The
approach that several state supreme courts have taken in recent years
toward the evaluation of modem tort reform is exactly the form of Lochner
Era analysis4 that was repudiated in 1937 on the basis of Realist critique.s
I believe that this is the reason that the form of economic analysis that
I and many others have conducted showing the benefits to consumers of
modem tort reform6 has had no effect on the constitutional debate. The
repudiation of the Lochner analysis in 1937 was not the consequence of
studies that showed that state economic regulation actually benefited the
citizenry. It was not the result of economic analysis demonstrating that the
minimum wage actually improved welfare (which we know it does not), or
that limits on the number of hours that people worked actually improved
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health and well-being (equally suspect). Indeed, when we consider how
irrelevant those economic arguments were to the revolution in 1937, we
can see some of the reasons that conservative economic analysis today has
not been very influential with regard to the constitutional debate over tort
reform.
Instead, the repudiation of Lochner and of the Lochner approach,
resulted from the conclusion that ineluctable principles such as freedom of
contract or the preservation of individual liberty were unrealistic as values
against which all state economic legislation should be measured. Once the
myth was debunked that the principles of liberty and freedom of contract
could control all economic legislation, then the grounds on which courts
could invalidate properly enacted legislation were far more limited than
had been earlier imagined.
Today, the United States labors under a similar myth regarding the
common law. There is a long and venerable intellectual tradition of
regarding the common law as in some way sacred, as autonomous and
independent of legislation, not simply in terms of content but in an almost
religious sense. Many regard the common law as somehow sacred in
contradistinction to political legislation regarded as profane.
The myth of the sacred common law has historical roots. It is surely
the approach of Blackstone, to whom Professor Presser refers in his paper.7
This myth was bolstered forcefully by philosophers, such as Hayek, who
contrasted the common law to redistributive legislation.8 The same myth
has received modem support from the law and economics school led by
Richard Posner.9 Judge Posner describes the common law as magically
efficient-in contrast to legislation, which is messy, undisciplined, and .
controlled by special interests. In a slightly different way, Richard Epstein
(Judge Posner's distinguished colleague), takes a similar approach. Epstein
believes that there is something mystical about the simplicity of the
common law and of common law principles that makes those principles
superior to legislative standards and legislative values. lO
As with all myths and visions of the sacred, however, no one can
precisely explain why the common law possesses these features. Perhaps
because the common law developed incrementally, case by case, over
hundreds of years, seemingly without regard to specific ends; perhaps
because its principles have been formulated in general terms-Hayek's
view. These features of the common law myth are not exactly reasons, but
7 Presser, supra note I, at 649.
8 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1978).
9 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998); RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
10 See generally RICHARD A. EpSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
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do serve to some as justifications for regarding the common law as sacred.
They do not qualify as reasons because none of them leads ineluctably
toward greater rationality in public policy. For example, the incremental
and case-by-case method of development might lead to irrationality and
incoherence, rather than the opposite. Similarly, that the common law was
developed without specific ends might suggest that, at heart, it is
purposeless. That it developed over hundreds of years might only mean
that it is anachronistic. And the fact that it can be described in general
principles is true only at a very high level of abstraction, not at the case
level where the rule might be confined to the relevant facts.
When dealing with a phenomenon approaching the sacred, however,
reasons and explanations are of minor importance--examine any religious
myth. The fact that the common law is accepted and endorsed very broadly
without regard to a coherent explanation of its inherent values proves the
point itself.
Ignoring Judge Posner and Professor Epstein, modem economic
analysis has shown that the sacred traits of the common law are truly
mythical. The common law is not efficient. Strict liability is not efficient.
The expansion of liability is not efficient. Professors Fried and Rosenberg
were correct when they argued that to promote efficiency, the expansion of
liability ought to be limited. I I I did not quite understand Professor
Rosenberg's advocacy of strict liability as the appropriate direction for
courts to take,12 but I think it can be demonstrated that our modem tort
system harms consumers, and it harms low income consumers most of all.
Tort law has a regressive redistributive effect (as Professors Fried and
Rosenberg pointed out),13 and is incomprehensible as a rational insurance
regIme.
Modem tort reform, notwithstanding Mr. Peck's description,
represents an effort to change the law to benefit consumers. Corporate and
insurance interests, as Professor Presser has described, are often viewed as
villains. Corporations, in contrast, are consumer representatives, though I
mean this in a slightly different sense than Professor Presser has suggested.
Professor Presser emphasized the fact that many citizens are now investors
in corporations and so may have some influence over corporate
decisionmaking or some interest in corporate welfare. 14 My point is that
corporations and insurance companies are representatives of consumers in
an entirely different way: Competition compels corporations and insurers to
11 Charles Fried & David Rosenberg, Presentation, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 625 (200 I).
12 [d. at 630.13 This point has been wen known at least since G.L. Priest, A Theory ofthe Consumer
Product Warranty, 90 YALE L.J. 1297 (1981).
14 Presser, supra note I, at 653-54.
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design manufactured products and insurance products to best meet
consumer demands. Those corporations and insurers who most ably
determine those demands and satisfy them most effectively receive the
greatest consumer support.
This point is related to modern tort reform. The largely-judicial
expansion of tort law has compelled manufacturers and insurers to provide
products and services at costs greater than the benefits to consumers. 15
Modern tort refonn seeks to change tort law in order to reduce those
excessive costs. Thus, tort refonn is not an effort to plunder, but rather to
reduce the costs incurred by consumers for investments that are of no value
to them.
Nevertheless, arguments regarding the economic effects of modem
tort law will never be sufficient to prevail in a battle with a common law
regarded as sacred. Indeed, to simply argue economics with regard to tort
reform is to see the issue as one of effect only· and to ignore the sacred
character of the common law. If state supreme court justices viewed the
issues raised by modern tort refonn legislation as involving economic
effects, rather than involving the degradation of the common law, then the
battle would be over. They do not, and the battle must continue.
What we need in the tort refonn debate-to the contrary of Professor
Presser-is not less Realism but more Realism. We must delegitimize the
common law principles upon which the state supreme courts rely-the
right to trial by jury; access to the courts; generalized due process-just as
the Realists delegitimized the constitutional concepts of individual liberty
and freedom of contract. This is not an impossible task. It is not purely an
economic task. Indeed, the currency that is still given to the proposition of
the general efficiency of the common law in some law and economic
circles is more hannful than helpful because it confuses an essentially
religious position-uniform efficiency-with careful economic analysis of
effects.
The survival of the myth of the sacred common law is somewhat
surprising because we have witnessed over the last century so many areas
in which legislation at the state or federal level has preempted or displaced
common law rules. Workers' compensation statutes are an obvious
example. But virtually every fonn of legislation at the state and federal
level since the New Deal represents an amendment of some duty or
relationship previously established by the common law because, prior to
the legislation, the common law controlled all economic relationships,
surely not true today.
15 See generally Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, supra note
6.
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The expansion of state and federal authority has been entirely at the
expense of the common law and of the Lochner-like approach adopted by
those state supreme courts that have invalidated modem tort reform
legislation. Unlike Professor Presser, I do not believe that a federal
solution to this problem is necessarily the appropriate answer, in part
because Congress remains committed to the common law myth. State
reform legislation, however, will never be ultimately successful until the
myth of the sacred common law is destroyed.
